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Who Killed Gladys Werlich? 
A Medical-Legal Moral Dilemma 
Jeanne Marie Scott 
Miss Scott is a 1969 graduate of the University of Detroit School of 
Law. She is a former assistant attorney general and spent six years as a 
staff attorney for The Catholic Hospital Association. She is currently 
engaged in the private practice of law in Washington, D.C., specializing 
in research and consultive services to the health care industry . 
Introduction 
THE CRIME: 
An elderly woman is viciously beaten by a gang of young thugs and 
left dying in the streets of a major American city. 
THE MEDICAL-MORAL CRISIS: 
The use of artificial life support units sustain the victim. Brain activity 
continues. Prognosis for recovery: none. 
MEDICAL DECISION: 
The respirator is discontinued and death occurs within the hour. 
THE COURTS: 
At trial , the defense raises the argument: "This was not a case of 
brain-death. " Inference: The defendant did not kill the victim: the 
doctors who disconnected the respirator did . 
THE QUESTION: 
"Who killed Gladys Werlich?" 
On one of those surprisingly warm days which can occur even in 
mid-winter Washington, D.C., 85-year-old Gladys Hinckley Werlich, 
one of the last pre-World War II society matrons who had made that 
city such a social center in the past, and who still lived a vibrant and 
independent life, not relying on her children or the public for support, 
was making her way home after visiting some of her more invalided 
friends. It was Jan . 13, 1976, and she was hurrying along Corcoran 
Avenue, Northwest, a vintage Washington street just then beginning to 
show signs of the renewal and revitalization which are shaping the 
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capital city's inner core. Suddenly, from behind, she was viciously 
attacked by four youths, one of whom clubbed her over the head, 
grabbed her purse, and disappeared into a nearby alley. 
Gladys Werlich was rushed to the intensive-care unit at George 
Washington University Medical Center; there she lay unconscious, the 
damage to her skull and brain extensive and irremediable. Unable to 
speak or move, she was placed on a respirator to assist her breathing 
and to take the pressure off her other body systems while the full 
damage could be assessed and evaluated. For five days she lay in this 
comatose state. On the sixth day, after consultation among her physi-
cians and after discussing the matter with her family who had been 
gathered at her bedside, the neurosurgeon assigned to her case turned 
off the respirator support unit. Twenty minutes later, Gladys Werlich 
was dead. 
The Criminal Trial 
Arrests were made on the basis of witness descriptions of four 
youths who had been seen loitering in the area shortly before the 
attack. One of these youths, Leroy Parker, was charged with the 
felony murder of Gladys Werlich, a capital offense under District of 
Columbia law. 
Trial began in the D.C. Superior Court in February, 1977. The 
Public Defender's office, assigned to counsel Parker during the trial, 
made numerous preliminary motions. 1 Among them was the argument 
that Leroy Parker had not legally caused the death of Mrs. Werlich, 
but rather that her death had been precipitated by the unwarranted 
and improper action of the neurosurgeon in disconnecting her life-
support units on that sixth day after the attack. The trial judge denied 
these motions and 19-year-old Leroy Parker was found guilty of 
second-degree murder and sentenced to six to 18 years in prison. 
The Appeal Process 
In briefs filed before the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia the first week of September, 1978, this same 
question of "Who caused the death of Gladys Werlich?" has been 
raised anew, and with a greater vigor and potential significance not 
only to Leroy Parker and the physicians who treated her, but also to 
the very fabric of U.S. criminal law. 
Unlike other criminal prosecutions for murder where respirators 
had been turned off, all parties this time agree that at the time of her 
death, Mrs. Werlich's brain was functioning and that the minimum 
criteria for "brain death" had not yet been met. She was alive. But 
what she was, according to Dr. Michael W. Dennis, the neurosurgeon 
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who had disconnected the support unit, was a patient "who could not 
talk, a patient who could not think, could not see, could not appre-
ciate anything in the world." It was (and still is) Dr. Dennis ' opinion 
that Gladys Werlich had suffered irreversible brain damage during that 
attack on Corcoran Avenue, and that she could not have survived even 
if extraordinary means such as the respirator had been continuously 
employed. 2 
In its brief submitted to the Court of Appeals, the Public Defend-
er's Office argued that the neurosurgeon had failed to follow accepted 
medical practices when he decided to disconnect the respiratory unit 
and that he had made a legally improper "value judgment as to t he 
quality of life" facing Mrs. Werlich, not the question of biological or 
medical life itself, which was the only thing he was legally and profes-
sionally competent to decide. Thus, according to the Defender 's argu-
ment, the act of the physician sufficiently broke the causal chain of 
events,3 to exonerate the Defender's client from guilt for any homi-
cide. At most, goes this argument, Leroy Parker might be found guilty 
of assault or robbery, but not murder. 
The Legal Debate 
The Appeals decision in the Werlich death case is not expected until 
after the first of this year, 1979. But the decision has already precipi-
tated considerable legal, as well as medical and philosophical debate. 
The District of Columbia Medical Society has set up a committee to 
evaluate the role of the physician in those treatment situations where 
death may be considered imminent, but where established brain-death 
criteria have clearly not yet been met. 
Lawyers, specializing in the intersectional areas of medicine and law, 
have raised considerable question as to the traditional legal concepts 
of "causality" which date back to America's English common law 
heritage. What, may we ask, is the purpose of a criminal statute that 
can be frustrated by unheard of and unbelievable medical advances to 
a society which had created that law 800 years ago? Or, for that 
matter, just ten years ago? Victims of crime, like Mrs. Werlich, would 
have died on the operating table just a few years ago. Now, semblances 
of life can be maintained - and are we to free the criminal assailants 
because of this scien tific progress? 
When decisions are made by physicians as to the termination of 
life-support treatment, these must be made in full consideration of the 
views and wishes of the family and the patient, and as a humane and 
reasonable response to the irreversible conditions that are deemed to 
exist and the vestiges of life remaining. No single set of criteria is 
sufficien t , but in each case the court can establish a standard of 
reasonableness, sufficient to satisfy both the criminal law, the rights of 
the defendant, and the needs of society. 
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New Law or Old 
Blind adherence by the law to previously accepted doctrines such as 
"proximate causality" and "intervening causality" cannot be allowed 
to frustrate the original purpose of t he law. An error was most likely 
made by the trial court in the original case of U.S. u. Parker. At that 
time the trial judge refused to give the jury any evidence or instruc-
tions as to either the medical condition of Mrs. Werlich (an instruction 
requested by the defendant) nor did he give the jury any evidence or 
instructions as to the problems facing the treating physicians, the 
emotional crisis caused to the victim 's family, nor to the previously 
expressed wishes of the patient herself. (Mrs. Werlich had , only a few 
weeks prior to the attack, executed a so-called " living will," expressing 
her wish not to be needlessly maintained on artificial or extraordinary 
medical devices.) This error by the trial court may , in fact, prove fatal 
to the prosecution's case made against Leroy Parker. Should are-trial 
be ordered, I would hope the appellate court would face the issues 
directly and leave some instructions and guidelines that might help the 
jury in a future case fully weigh the facts and circumstances. The 
appeals court must not shy away from establishing a new standard of 
legal guilt or innocence compatible with advances in medical science 
and the full meaning and purpose of the criminal law. 
A Proposal 
Such a standard might take the form of a model jury instruction 
along the following lines: 
If you, the ju ry , find as a matter of fact that the medical cond ition of the 
victim to the alleged cl·ime, and as a result of the acts of the defendant, was 
irreversible according to current medical standards; and if you find, as a 
matter of fact, that but for the use of artificial respiratory or other life· 
.,support units, the victim would die with in a foreseeable period of time 
because of the injuries attr ibu ted to the acts of the defendant; and if you 
fi nd that the treating physicians to the victim and the family of the victim 
have acted humanely and reasonably in terminating the use of such arti-
fic ial respiratory or other means of Iife·support , th en you may, as a matter 
of fact, find that the resu ltant death of the victim had been directly and 
immediately caused by the criminal acts of the defendant, and you may find 
the defendant guilty of hom ic ide as requested by the People." 
The law has never pretended to be perfect. All too often it has had 
to be dragged " kicking and screaming" into new areas and to break 
old, no longer meaningful, molds. The question of legal causality in 
perpetration of a criminal act is considered a material fact generally to 
be decided by a jury. The judge and the court bear the burden and 
responsibility of deciding which evidence the jury will hear and how it 
will be instructed, as a matter of law, to evaluate that evidence. New 
law is needed to meet the exigencies of modern society. Such homi-
cide cases as the Werlich case, can be anticipated to occur with much 
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greater frequency. We can only hope that the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, hearing this case in the first instance, will not back away 
from breaking the old pattern. Justice demands a recognition of new 
conditions. Our society can accept nothing less. 
REFERENCES 
1. Among the other motions made by the defense , and denied b y the trial 
court, was a motion to instruct the jury on the ancient legal maxim of a "year and 
a day." This rule would have the effect of exonerating from liability , under either 
criminal or negligence law, any defendant where the victim survived for more than 
a year and a day after the injury-causing incident. By law , and only through this 
legal artifice , the victim was presumed to have died from other causes. In this 
modern era , survival in a greatly debilitated and still fatal state may easily be 
prolonged in excess of a year. 
2. It was Dr. Dennis' opinion that Mrs. Werlich would have lived but a few days 
longer in any event. The decision to terminate her treatment was made at the 
request of the family with the approval of the entire medical team treating Mrs. 
Werlich. If the "year and a day " argument had been permitted before the jury , 
further instructions would have to have accompanied it to allow the jury to make 
a "factual" determination as to when Mrs. Werlich would have died , with or 
without m edical intervention. It was the defense's hope to raise the Karen Ann 
Quinlan situation to show that " life" migh t be maintained for years yet to come . 
3. According to Black·s Law Dictionary (4th Edition), " proximate causality" is 
defined as: " That which, in a natural and continuous sequence , unbroken by a ny 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the resu lt 
would not have occurred. " The defense 's argument was obviously to show that 
the medical intervention broke the causal chain of events, thus taking the defend-
ant "off the hook," so to speak . 
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